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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction over plaintiff's Appeal and defendants' 
Cross-Appeal is proper in the Court of Appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann, , § 78-2a-3(2) (j) in that this matter been transferred 
to the Court of Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL PRESENTS THE FOLLOWING ISSUES: 
I. HAS THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO MEET HIS BORDEN TO SHOW THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT WHICH SUPPORT THE TRIAL 
COURT1 S RULING OF UNILATERAL MISTAKE WERE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's findings of fact 
will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. Hoth 
v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 216 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). An appellant 
must marshal 1 all evidence in favor of the facts as found by the 
trial court and then demonstrate that even viewing the evidence 
in a light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is 
insufficient to support the findings of fact. Saunders v. 
Sharp, 154 UAR 5 (Utah Feb. 12, 1991). 
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II. IS IT UNNECESSARY FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO INTERVENE ON 
THE ISSUE OF THE MEASURE OF PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES? 
Standard of Review: Issue II presents a question of 
law which is reviewed for correctness. Saunders v. Sharp, 154 
UAR 5 (Feb. 12, 1991). 
III. DOES THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT PRECLUDE PLAINTIFF FROM AN 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES? 
Standard of Review: Issue III presents a question of 
law which is reviewed for correctness. Saunders v. Sharp. 154 
UAR 5 (Feb. 12, 1991). 
DEFENDANTS' CROSS-APPEAL PRESENTS THE FOLLOWING ISSUES: 
I. IS THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION OF LAW REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S 
FRAUD INCONSISTENT WITH THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT? 
Standard of Review: Issue I presents a question of 
law which is reviewed for correctness. Saunders v. Sharp, 154 
UAR 5 (Feb. 12, 1991). 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves a dispute over the rescission of an 
agreement to purchase a personal residence. In about July of 
1987, defendants, Mark and Kathryn Van Wagoner, responded to a 
for sale sign which had been placed on a residence owned in fee 
by plaintiff, John Klas. The sign was part of the marketing of 
the property undertaken by plaintiff's ex-wife and agent, Carol 
Klas. After several conversations between Carol Klas and 
defendants concerning the property and appraisals of the 
property, defendants and plaintiff entered into an earnest money 
agreement for the purchase of the home. 
Thereafter, defendants learned that the 
representations made by Carol Klas were misleading and omitted 
to disclose an existing, low market value appraisal, and 
defendants attempted to rescind the earnest money agreement. In 
the course of a conversation with Klas1 counsel, defendants 
understood that the contract had been rescinded. Later, 
plaintiff refused to a written rescission of the agreement, 
returned defendants' earnest money, sold the home and sued 
defendants on the difference between the eventual sales price 
3 
and the sales price listed in the earnest money agreement with 
defendants. Defendants denied that there was a valid contract 
and counterclaimed for fraud and detrimental reliance. 
Thereafter, discovery ensued and then a trial was conducted on 
May 9, 10 and 12, 1989. 
On or about May 30, 1989, the trial court rendered its 
memorandum decision and found in favor of plaintiff. Subsequent 
to the memorandum decision of May 30, 1989, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusion of Law and a Judgment were presented to the trial 
court. Objections were filed by defendants, together with a 
Motion to Amend the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
Defendants also requested a new trial. 
The trial court then entered a Supplemental Memorandum 
Decision on November 30, 1989, finding that there was a 
unilateral mistake by the defendants. (Record at pp. 220-223). 
The trial court then entered Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law based on its Supplemental Memorandum 
Decision, dated May 31, 1990 and also rendered an Amended 
Judgment, dated July 3, 1990. (Record at pp. 309-312). 
Plaintiff and defendants then filed their respective 
Notices of Appeal. 
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II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendants1 dispute plaintiffs1 statement of facts and 
offer the following: 
1. The property which is the subject of this action 
is a parcel of real estate located at 2340 Berkley Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. (Amended Findings of Fact No. 1, Record at p. 
298) . 
2. At all times relevant to the issues involved, the 
plaintiff, John H. Klas, was the owner in fee simple of said 
property. (Amended of Findings of Fact No. 2, Record at p. 
298) . 
3. In late July or early August, 1987, the subject 
property was offered for sale pursuant to the terms of a Decree 
of Divorce in Civil No. D-86-1705, in the District Court of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. (Amended Findings of Fact No. 3, 
Record at p. 298). 
4. Pursuant to the provisions of the aforesaid Decree 
of Divorce, the former wife of plaintiff, Carol Klas, undertook 
the marketing of the property and said property was not listed 
5 
with a real estate broker. (Amended Findings of Fact No. 4, 
Record at p. 298). 
5. In 1986, plaintiff and his then wife, Carol Klas, 
acquired an appraisal by Devere Kent for mortgage loan purposes. 
That appraisal showed a market value of between $153,000 and 
$165,000. The purpose of obtaining the appraisal was to secure 
a second mortgage on the Klas1 marital residence. (Transcript, 
Volume I at page 32, lines 22-25). 
6. In anticipation of the sale of the property in 
1987, plaintiff had personal acquaintances provide their 
opinions on the current value of the property which plaintiff 
and his wife, Carol Klas agreed to use, as a basis for 
establishing the market value for the sale of the property. 
Said opinions ranged from $175,000 to $192,000. (Amended 
Finding of Fact No. 5, Record at pp. 298-299). 
7. In late July or early August, 1987, the defendants 
inspected the property in the presence of Carol Klas and 
expressed an interest in acquiring the property. (Amended 
Finding of Fact No. 6, Record at p. 299). 
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8. As part of their initial contacts with Carol Klas 
defendant, Mark Van Wagoner, specifically asked Carol Klas how 
the property had been valued. (Amended Finding of Fact No. 30, 
Record at p. 305; Transcript, Volume II, at page 148, lines 19-
21) . 
9. In response, Carol Klas informed defendants that 
three appraisals had been made in the range of $175,000 to 
$192,000. Although she was aware of its existence, Carol Klas 
did not disclose the existence or amount of the Devere Kent 
appraisal. (Transcript, Volume I, at page 93, lines 9-15). 
10. Carol Klas never provided defendants with 
information regarding the Devere Kent appraisal despite the 
defendants1 specific inquiry regarding appraisals and their 
request for copies of any of the appraisals. (Amended Finding 
of Fact No. 30, Record at p. 305). 
11. Carol Klas informed defendants that John H. Klas 
would not even entertain an offer that was below the lowest of 
the appraisals. (Transcript, Vol. I, p. 182, lines 2-5). 
12. On or about August 7, 1987, defendants presented 
Carol Klas with an earnest money agreement for the purchase of 
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the home with an offered purchase price of $175,000, which they 
understood to be the lowest value established by the three 
appraisals disclosed to them. (Transcript, Vol. I, p. 181, 
lines 19-25, p. 182, lines 1-12). 
13. Carol Klas then presented defendants' offer to 
her former husband, John H. Klas, who accepted it on August 11, 
1987. (Amended Finding of Fact No. 9, Record at p. 300). 
14. After repeated requests for copies of the 
appraisals, plaintiff finally provided defendants a copy of the 
Devere Kent appraisal and disclosed that in truth, he had no 
other written appraisals. Defendants then sought to renegotiate 
the earnest money based upon the belated disclosure of the only 
written appraisal. (Amended Finding of Fact Nos. 12 and 13, 
Record at pp. 300-301). 
15. Thereafter, plaintiff returned defendants1 
earnest money deposit, sold the subject property for $160,000, 
an amount squarely in the middle of the Devere Kent appraisal, 
and brought this action against defendants to recover his 
supposed damages. In return, defendants asserted their 
counterclaim against defendants. 
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16. The trial judge found that, in the course of 
negotiations between the defendants and Carol Klas, there 
existed the Devere Kent appraisal valuing the property at 
$165,000, the existence of which was unknown to defendants, and 
if known, would have made a material difference to their offer 
to buy the subject property. This was a unilateral mistake on 
the part of the defendants which was fundamental and 
substantial. The Devere Kent appraisal was never provided by 
Carol Klas in spite of defendants1 request for copies of 
appraisals. (Amended Finding of Fact No. 30, Record at p. 305) . 
17. The trial judge further found that, the 
defendants offered a price of $175,000 for the property in 
question, based upon representations made by Carol Klas 
regarding three appraisals and without knowledge of the Devere 
Kent appraisal. (Amended Finding of Fact No. 31, Record at p. 
306) . 
18. The defendants made no attempt to secure 
appraisals on the subject property prior to the time the earnest 
money sales agreement was entered into by the parties, because 
of representations made by Carol Klas that there were three 
appraisals in existence which placed values on the subject 
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property between a low of $175,000 and a high of $192,000. 
(Amended of Finding of Fact No. 32, Record at p. 306). 
19. The trial court made the following conclusions of 
law: 
a. "The Van Wagoners were mistaken in their 
understanding that the lowest existing appraisal on 
the property was $175,000." (Conclusion of Law No. 1, 
Record at p. 306). 
b. Their mistake was caused by their 
misunderstanding of the representations made by Carol 
Klas, and failure to have the Devere Kent appraisal 
provided in a timely manner." (Conclusion of Law No. 
2, Record at p. 306). 
c. "The mistake was substantial and fundamental 
to the proposed agreement between the defendants and 
plaintiff. If the Van Wagoners had been aware of the 
undisclosed, lower appraisal, it would have made a 
material difference in their offer to buy the 
property." (Conclusion of Law No. 3, Record at p. 
306) . 
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d. "The mistake provides a basis for recision 
of the Ernest Money Agreement." (Conclusion of Law 
No, 4, Record at p. 306). 
20. The trial court went on to dismiss the 
plaintiff's Complaint, rescind the Ernest Money Agreement and 
dismiss the Defendant's Counterclaim. The trial court also 
ordered each side to bear their own costs, attorney fees and 
expenses of litigation. (Conclusions of Law Nos. 5 through 8, 
Record at p. 307). 
21. Defendants filed their Notice of Appeal from the 
trial court's Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Amended Judgment on July 31, 1990. (Record at pp. 316-318). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. DEFENDANTS1 RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS APPEAL 
I. PLAINTIFF HAS NOT MET HIS BURDEN TO SHOW CLEAR ERROR BECAUSE 
HE HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE AND HAS NOT SHOWN THAT 
TAKEN AS A WHOLE, THE EVIDENCE FAILS TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT REGARDING UNILATERAL MISTAKE AND 
RECISION. 
II. THERE IS NO BASIS TO OVERTURN THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS 
AND, THEREFORE, NO BASIS TO REACH THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES. 
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III. THE STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S 
ATTORNEY FEES WAS PREMISED ON THE TRIAL COURT AWARDING 
FEES IN THE FIRST PLACE. THE TRIAL COURT MADE NO SUCH 
AWARD AND PURSUANT TO THE PARTIES STIPULATION, PLAINTIFF 
IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES. 
B. DEFENDANT'S CROSS-APPEAL 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S LEGAL CONCLUSION THAT PLAINTIFF DID NOT 
COMMIT FRAUD IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS 
OF FACT. 
ARGUMENT 
I. REPLY TO BRIEF OF APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF. 
POINT I: The Trial Court's Ruling On Mistake Is Consistent With 
and Supported by The Facts Presented At Trial. 
In its conclusions of law, the trial court found that 
"the Van Wagoners were mistaken in their understanding that the 
lowest existing appraisal on the property was $175,000." (Record 
at 311). As a result, the trial court found that a unilateral 
mistake of fact sufficient to warrant recision of the Earnest 
Money Agreement existed. 
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In his brief on appeal, plaintiff argues that this 
conclusion of law could not possibly follow from the evidence 
presented at trial and claims that "defendants failed to show 
the elements present to allow rescission." (Plaintiff's Brief at 
page 14). In short, plaintiff claims that the trial court's 
Findings of Fact are not supported by the evidence presented at 
trial. 
A. Plaintiff has failed to marshal the evidence 
which supports the trial court's findings of 
fact. 
This Court has made it clear that a trial court's 
findings of fact will not be disturbed unless they are clearly 
erroneous. Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 216 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990); Burrow v. Vrontikis, 788 P.2d 1046 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
As the Court stated in Hoth: 
When challenging findings of fact on 
appeal, the appellant must show that the 
factual findings are clearly erroneous. To 
show clear error, the appellant must 
marshall all the evidence supporting the 
trial court's factual findings and then 
demonstrate that the evidence, including 
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, 
is insufficient to support the findings. 
Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d at 216. 
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Recently, the Utah Supreme Court held: 
An appellate court does not lightly disturb 
the verdict of a jury nor the findings of 
fact made by a trial court. If a challenge 
is made to the findings, an appellant must 
marshal all the evidence in favor of the 
facts as found by the trial court and then 
demonstrate that viewing the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the court below, 
the evidence is insufficient to support 
findings of fact. 
Saunders v. Sharp, 154 UAR 5 (Utah Feb. 12, 1991). 
While plaintiff argues that the trial court's findings 
of fact are erroneous, there is no effort by him, and no basis 
in his brief, to support a reversal based on the "clearly 
erroneous" standard which governs this appeal. Rather than 
marshall the evidence as this Court requires, plaintiff simply 
argues that there is testimony in the record which might support 
his theory of the case. Plaintiff's efforts fall woefully short 
of carrying his burden of proof to show that given the evidence 
as a whole the trial court clearly erred. Plaintiff has not 
even attempted to marshall all the evidence. 
When one reads the record the reason for this omission 
is obvious. Plaintiff could not marshal the evidence which 
serves as the basis for the trial court's ruling and still claim 
grounds for his appeal. Had plaintiff attempted to meet his 
burden and had he revisited all the evidence, it would too 
clearly support the trial court's ruling. 
B. The evidence presented at trial supports the 
trial court's findings of fact which support the 
trial court's ruling on unilateral mistake. 
Even though plaintiff failed to meet his burden of 
proof and the appeal must be dismissed on that ground alone, it 
is helpful to realize how strongly the record supports the trial 
court's findings of unilateral mistake. The evidence is 
overwhelming. Indeed, for this Court's convenience, defendants 
have annotated the trial court's unilateral mistake findings of 
fact to the record of testimony presented at trial. This 
annotation is attached hereto as appendix "A" and incorporated 
herein by this reference. 
As plaintiff has pointed out, unilateral mistake 
involves four elements; 
1. The mistake must be of so grave a consequence 
that to enforce the contract as actually made 
would be unconscionable. 
2. The matter as to which the mistake was made must 
relate to a material feature of the contract. 
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3. Generally, the mistake must have occurred 
notwithstanding the existence of ordinary 
diligence by the party making the mistake. 
4. It must be possible to give relief by way of 
rescission without serious prejudice to the other 
party except the loss of his bargain. In other 
words it must be possible to put in the status 
quo. (Plaintiff's Brief at page 11, citing Grahn 
v. Gregory, 800 P.2d 320 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). 
The trial court's Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law set forth the factual basis for the ruling or unilateral 
mistake. In pertinent part, the trial court found: 
In the course of the negotiations between 
the defendants and Carol Klas, there 
existed the Devere Kent appraisal valuing 
the property at $165,000, the existence of 
which was unknown to defendants, and if 
known, would have made a material 
difference to their offer to buy the 
subject property. This was a unilateral 
mistake on the part of the defendants which 
was fundamental and substantial. The 
Devere Kent appraisal was never provided by 
Carol Klas in spite of defendants' request 
for copies of appraisals. (Record at p. 
305).1 
This Finding of Fact is born out by the testimony 
presented at trial. As defendants' annotation shows, defendants 
1
 The court's finding regarding plaintiff's fraud is admitted 
here, but will be discussed in defendants' argument on cross-appeal 
herein. 
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testified that they specifically asked plaintiff's agent, Carol 
Klas, about the existence of appraisals on the subject property 
before the earnest money agreement was signed. Mrs. Van Wagoner 
testified that during her first contact with Carol Klas on or 
about July 25, 1987, she specifically asked Carol Klas if there 
were any appraisals on the home. (Transcript, Vol. II, p. 148, 
lines 19-21) . In response, Carol Klas stated that she had three 
appraisals. (Transcript, Volume II, pages 180 through 182). As 
Van Wagoner's testified, Carol Klas told the Van Wagoners that 
those appraisals indicted the home had an appraisal market value 
of somewhere between $175,000 to $192,000. (Transcript, Volume 
I, at page 181-182). 
In contrast with that statement, as both plaintiff and 
Carol Klas admitted at trial, at the time of Carol Klas1 
representations to the Van Wagoners, they kept hidden an 
appraisal (the "Kent" appraisal) which valued the home at 
approximately $153,000 to $165,000, some $10,000 to $20,000 
below what Carol Klas had represented as the lowest appraised 
value of the home. (Transcript, Vol. II, p. 42, lines 1-14). 
Mr. Van Wagoner testified that, the offer itself was based on 
the lowest value of the three represented appraisals. This 
point was critical because Carol Klas represented that John Klas 
would not even consider an offer less than the lowest appraised 
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value. (Transcript, Vol. I, p. 181, lines 19-25, p. 182, lines 
1-12). The trial court subsequently found that the existence of 
the undisclosed Kent appraisal was material to the Van Wagoner's 
decision to make the offer on the home. (Record at p. 306) . 
That is, the Van Wagoners would not have executed the Earnest 
Money Agreement in the amount of $175,000 if Carol Klas had 
disclosed the Kent appraisal in response to the Van Wagoner's 
specific inquiry. 
Such testimony supports the trial court's previously 
cited Findings of Fact. Those findings of facts, in turn, serve 
an appropriate basis for the trial court's Conclusions of Law 
that: 
1. The Van Wagoners were mistaken in their 
understanding that the lowest existing appraisal 
on the property was $175,000. 
2. Their mistake was caused by their 
misunderstanding of the representations made by 
Carol Klas, and failure to have the Devere Kent 
appraisal provided in a timely manner. 
3. The mistake was substantial and fundamental to 
the proposed agreement between the defendants and 
plaintiff. If the Van Wagoners had been made 
aware of the undisclosed, lower appraisal, it 
would have made a material difference to their 
offer to buy the property. 
4. The mistake provides a basis for rescission of 
the earnest money agreement. 
18 
(Record at p. 306). 
Clearly, the evidence supports the trial court's 
finding of unilateral mistake. First, it would be 
unconscionable to enforce the contract and allow plaintiff to 
profit from the misrepresentations of "appraised" value and the 
omission of the Kent appraisal. Second, as the court 
specifically found, the matter as to which the mistake was made, 
the value of the home in question, was material to the contract. 
Third, as the court found, the mistake occurred despite 
defendants' requests for appraisals which would have avoided the 
mistake. And fourth, Plaintiff was placed in the status quo. 
That is, the contract was rescinded and plaintiff was in the 
same position as he was before he entered into the contract with 
defendants. Indeed, plaintiff sold the home after a short 
remarketing effort for $160,000, a sum consistent with the Kent 
appraisal. 
C. The Trial Court's Interpretation of the Law on 
Unilateral Mistake is Correct. 
The trial court found that the Earnest Money Agreement 
had to be rescinded because of the unilateral mistake which had 
occurred relating to the meaning of the term "appraisal". The 
trial court found that the mistake was caused whether innocently 
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or not, by the Klas1 use of the word "appraisal". Plaintiff 
argues that the trial court relied on the holding in Guardian 
State Bank v. Stanql. 778 P.2d 1 (Utah 1989) as the basis for 
its ruling on unilateral mistake. Plaintiff then argues that 
Stanal is factually distinguishable. Even if Stanql could be 
distinguished factually, Stanal stands for a legal proposition 
supports the trial courtfs finding of unilateral mistake. 
The Court in Guardian State Bank v. Stanql, 778 P.2d 
1 (Utah 1989), specifically agreed with Professor Corbin's 
formulation of the law of mistake and showed that in the State 
of Utah that legal theory of the law of mistake is controlling. 
The Utah Supreme Court quoted from Professor Corbin, stating 
that, "There is practically universal agreement that, if the 
material mistake of one party was caused by the other, either 
purposely or innocently or was known to him, or was of such 
character and accompanied by such circumstances that he has 
reason to know of it, the mistaken party has a right to 
rescission." 3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, § 610, at 692 
(1960) (emphasis added). Stanql. 778 P.2d at 5. The Court 
relied on Stanql and properly applied Stanql as precedents for 
the proposition that even a unilateral mistake can be a complete 
defense and afford rescission. 
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If anything, factually, the case at bar is more 
egregious than Stanal. In Stangl, for example, the Court 
reasoned that Stangl knew of the mistake because he knew the 
bank had not intended to become liable on the original note. In 
essence, the mistake gave Stangl a windfall. There is evidence 
in this case that the Klases engineered the Van Wagoners1 
mistake. That was not so in Stangl. Stangl does make it clear, 
however, that the mistake in the case at bar constitutes a 
complete defense to the earnest money, and rescission is the 
only appropriate remedy. Anything else gives Klas a windfall. 
Stangl clearly supports the trial court's ruling 
rescinding the earnest money on the basis of unilateral mistake. 
In addition, the plaintiff misstates consequences of upholding 
the trial court's ruling in this case. The plaintiff states 
that "It would be virtually impossible to enforce any contract 
if either party chose to come forward and allege that they had 
•misunderstood' some aspect of the transaction which they alone 
deem to be of great significance." (Plaintiff's brief at p. 
18) . The plaintiff does not understand the law of mistake as it 
is applied in the State of Utah. A misunderstanding of an 
aspect of the transaction which one party deems to be of great 
significance is not the focus of the law on unilateral mistake. 
Rather, according to the holding in Grahn v. Gregory, 800 P.2d 
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320 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) , the mistake must be one that the court 
views as relating to a material feature of the contract. 
Therefore, it is not just a misunderstanding as to "some aspect 
of the transaction" but must a mistake which was material to the 
contract. 
In the present case the mistake was very material to 
the contract as the contract price was based upon the 
representations or misrepresentations about the "appraisals" 
which had been obtained on the property. The trial court found 
that the existence of the Devere Kent appraisal was unknown to 
defendants, "and if known, would have made a material difference 
to their offer to buy the subject property. This was a 
unilateral mistake on the part of the defendants which was 
fundamental and substantial." (Record at p. 305). 
Defendants request that the Court uphold the trial 
court's ruling on unilateral mistake as the ruling clearly falls 
within the legal standard for unilateral mistake as set forth in 
Stangl and Grahn. 
POINT II: The Trial Court's Ruling Regarding Plaintiff's Damages 
Is Consistent With The Facts Presented At Trial. 
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There is no basis to overturn the trial court's 
findings, and therefore no basis to reach the issue of damages. 
Even if the court were to remand, plaintiff has provided no 
sound basis to reevaluate the trial courts ability to calculate 
damages but is asking this Court to indulge his wish for more 
money on a purely speculative, hypothetical basis. 
POINT III: Plaintiff Is Not Entitled To An Award Of 
Attorneys Fees Because The Trial Court Did Not 
Award Fees. 
The trial court made no award of attorney fees. 
Because there was no award, there is nothing for this Court to 
sustain or uphold. Plaintiff refers to a stipulation between 
the parties, but that stipulation, by its own terms, required 
an award of attorney fees for a stipulated amount to take 
effect if the trial court awarded fees. Because there was no 
award, there is nothing further to be decided. 
II. APPELLEES/DEFENDANTS1 BRIEF ON CROSS-APPEAL. 
POINT 1: The Trial Courtis Legal Conclusion That Plaintiff 
Is Not Responsible For The Material 
Misrepresentations Of His Agent Is Incorrect. 
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The trial court1s findings are clear and plaintiff 
does not here dispute those findings. Nevertheless, the 
court's findings compelled a legal conclusion of fraud and the 
court's legal conclusions failed to follow its factual 
findings. 
A. The Court's Findings Regarding Carol Klas1 
Omission Compel A Legal Conclusion Of Fraud. 
The trial court found a false representation of an 
existing material fact. In the trial court's words, "In the 
course of negotiations between defendants and Carol Klas, 
there existed the Devere Kent appraisal valuing the property 
at $165,000, the existence of which was unknown to defendants, 
and if known, would have made a material difference in their 
offer to buy the subject property. ... The Devere Kent 
appraisal was never provided by Carol Klas in spite of 
defendant's request for copies of appraisals." (Amended 
Finding of Fact No. 30, Record at p. 305). 
It is important to note that the trial court found 
that Carol Klas did not disclose information regarding the 
appraisals of the subject property when specifically requested 
to do so by defendants. (Id.) . "Misrepresentation may be made 
either by affirmative statement or by material omission, where 
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there exists a duty to speak." Suaarhouse Finance Company v. 
Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1980). As the Court in 
Suaarhouse points out, the potential victim of fraud must take 
steps to inform himself and protect his interests. Id. In 
this case, the Van Wagoners took those steps when they asked 
Carol Klas if there were any appraisals on the home. They 
relied on Carol's answers as being truthful. Indeed, they 
could do no more. They could not have discovered the 
existence of Devere Kent appraisal without the Klas1 
disclosure of it. In fact, that is the only way they 
subsequently discovered the existence of the appraisal. 
Carol Klas either knowingly or recklessly failed to 
disclose this material fact. The appraisal existed at the 
time the Van Wagoners dealt with Carol Klas. (Amended Finding 
of Fact Nos. 5 and 6, Record at pp. 298-299). In addition, 
John Klas admitted that at the time the Devere Kent appraisal 
was obtained, Carol Klas was married to him and the purpose of 
the appraisal was to secure a second mortgage they were 
seeking on their marital residence. (Transcript, Volume I, 
page 32, lines 22-25). Similarly, Carol Klas admitted that 
she knew of the Kent Appraisal a year before the house was to 
be sold. (Transcript, Vol. I, p. 132, lines 4-19.) 
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Carol Klas also admitted that she and John met ii 
June 1987 to plan the sale of the house and that he gave hei 
guidelines to follow. (Transcript, Vol. I, p. 83, line 16.) 
Clearly, the purpose behind hiding the Devere Kent appraisa] 
was to induce defendants to offer to the property at thi 
higher appraised prices Carol Klas said they had. It is 
critical to this marketing plan to call friends1 opinions 
appraisals and to conceal the only real appraisal. It is n< 
coincidence that the amount the Van Wagoners offered was equal 
to the what Carol Klas said was the lowest appraised value oi 
the home. (Amended Finding of Fact No. 7-9, Record at pp 
299-300.) 
Lastly, the trial court specifically found that th< 
Van Wagoners relied on Carol Klas1 representations (Amende< 
Finding of Fact No. 22, Record at p. 303) , and also found tha* 
the non-disclosed information was material to defendants 
decision to enter into the contract with plaintiff. (Amende* 
Conclusion of Law Nos. 2 & 3, Record at p. 306). 
Given these specific findings, the trial couri 
should have concluded that plaintiff committed a fraud on th< 
defendants. 
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B. The Court's Legal Conclusion That John Klas Did 
Not Make Misrepresentations To The Defendants 
Was Incorrect Because John Klas Was Bound By 
The Misrepresentations (And Omissions) Of His 
Agent Carol Klas, As A Matter Of Law. 
The trial court found that Carol Klas acted as 
plaintiff's agent in her transactions with defendants. 
Indeed, the evidence overwhelmingly supported a finding that 
Carol Klas acted as plaintiff's agent. Carol Klas undertook 
the marketing of the home which plaintiff owned in fee. 
(Amended Finding of Fact Nos. 2 & 4, Record at p. 238). 
Because plaintiff owned the home in fee, Carol only could act 
as his agent. Her actions with regard to the sale of the home 
evidence this agency relationship: First, she admits she met 
in June with John where he gave her certain guidelines to 
follow. (Transcript, Vol I, p. 83, line 16.) As plaintiff 
asserts, Carol Klas advertised the property for sale and held 
an "open house" as part of her efforts to sell the house for 
plaintiff (Plaintiff's Brief at p. 5; Transcript, Vol. I at 
pp. 18-20); Carol Klas negotiated the sale of the home with 
defendants (Amended Finding of Fact Nos. 12, 19, 20, 22, 30, 
31 and 32, Record at pp. 300, 302-03 and 305-306); and she 
presented the offer for the sale to plaintiff (Amended Finding 
of Fact No. 9, Record at p. 299; Plaintiff's Brief at p. 5; 
Transcript, Vol. 1 at pp. 21-22; Transcript Vol. II at pp. 98-
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99) in anticipation that plaintiff would pay her a finders fee 
of 3% of the gross sales price (Plaintiff's Brief at p. 5; 
Transcript, Vol. I at pp. 6-8). 
It is clear under Utah law that a principal is 
responsible for the actions of his agent when those actions 
are taken within the scope of the agency. Jensen v. Manila 
Corporation and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Dav 
Saints. 565 P.2d 63, 65 (Utah 1977) ("A representation by a 
real estate agent as to the quality of land, or boundary lines 
is generally held to be binding on the principal"); see also 
Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company, 801 P.2d 
934 (Utah 1989). Certainly, Carol Klas's actions in dealing 
with defendants were taken in the scope of her agency with 
plaintiff. Indeed, it is undisputed that Carol Klas was 
acting as plaintiff's real estate agent in the negotiations 
with defendants for the purchase of plaintiff's home. 
Regardless of whether plaintiff personally 
misrepresented the actual facts which induced defendants to 
enter into the contract in question, it is undisputed that 
Carol Klas failed to disclose a material fact known to her 
when the information was specifically sought by defendants. 
That act constitutes the fraud which serves as the basis for 
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defendants1 counterclaim. It is a clear error of law for the 
trial court to find that plaintifffs agent omitted to disclose 
facts which made her other representations misleading but then 
conclude as a matter of law that plaintiff is insulated from 
that fraud because he hired an agent, gave her guidelines, and 
then stepped back. 
In short, the trial court's factual findings follow 
the elements of fraud set out in the seminal case of Pace v. 
Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (1952): (1) a 
representation was made (only three appraisals); (2) 
concerning an existing material fact (the existence of 
appraisals); (3) which was false (the three appraisals were 
only opinions and, moreover, there was a fourth, much lower, 
real appraisal); (4) which the representor knew to be false 
(Mr. & Mrs. Klas both admit knowledge of the Kent appraisal) ; 
(5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act (they 
wanted a high price); (6) the other party, acting reasonably 
and in ignorance of it falsity (the Van Wagoners inquired 
about appraisals and had no knowledge of the truth); (7) did 
in fact rely (the high offer was consistent with the supposed 
appraisal) ; (8) and was induced to act (the Van Wagoners 
signed the Earnest Money, and then hired architects, craftsmen 
and spent money in anticipation of owning the house; and (9) 
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to their injury and damage (the Van Wagoners lost thousands of 
dollars in out of pocket expenditures). 
Under the basic principles of agency, plaintiff is 
responsible for the misrepresentations of his agent as if he 
had made those misrepresentations himself. Such a result is 
just given the fact that plaintiff can seek relief against his 
agent for the fraud which support defendants1 counterclaim. 
The trial court's ruling on defendants' counter-claim should 
be reversed, judgment entered in favor of defendants on their 
counterclaim for fraud and the case remanded to the trial 
court for a determination of damages. 
CONCLUSION 
I. The Trial Courts Ruling Regarding Unilateral Mistake 
Should Be Affirmed. 
Plaintiff has failed to marshal the evidence and 
demonstrate the that the trial court's findings of fact are 
clearly erroneous. Given the testimony and other evidence 
presented at trial, it is clear that the trial court's 
findings of fact with regard to unilateral mistake and 
rescission are free from error. Thus, the trial court's 
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ruling regarding unilateral mistake and rescission are proper 
and should be affirmed. 
II. The Trial Courts Dismissal of the Counterclaim for Fraud 
Should be Reversed. 
This Court should reverse the trial court's 
dismissal of the counterclaim for fraud as John Klas through 
his agent, Carol Klas, clearly had a duty to speak when asked 
about appraisals, and the omission to disclose the Devere Kent 
appraisal constituted fraud. 
The nine elements of fraud made clear in Pace v. 
Parrish, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952) are found here as facts by 
the Court. Here, however, the fraud was principally by 
omission which made the other representations misleading. 
Defendant respectfully requests that the Court enter 
judgment on the counterclaim and remand that part of the case 
for a finding of the amount of damage. 
DATED this Zo^k day of March, 1991. 
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS 
Lewis T. Stevens 
Alexander H. Walker III 
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APPENDIX "A" 
What follows is an annotation of the trial court's 
Amended Findings of Fact which support the trial court's 
ruling on unilateral mistake and rescission. The paragraphs 
are numbered as they appear in the trial court's Amended 
Findings of Fact. 
This annotation is not intended to be an exhaustive 
summary of the evidence which supports all of the trial 
court's findings of fact. Only those findings of fact which 
relate to the issue of unilateral mistake and rescission are 
listed below. Indeed, some portions of particular findings of 
fact are omitted where those portions are irrelevant to the 
court's ruling on unilateral mistake. These annotations 
simply indicate that there was sufficient testimony given at 
trial upon which the court could base the particular findings 
of fact. 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
2. At all times relevant to the issues involved, the 
plaintiff John H. Klas was the owner in fee simple of said 
property. 
Testimony of John H. Klas: "Q. In the decree of 
divorce, as granted were you awarded that home as 
your sole and separate property? A. Yes I was." 
(Transcript, Vol. I, at p.7, 1.8-11). 
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3. In late July or early August, 1987, the subject 
property was offered for sale pursuant to the terms of a 
decree of divorce in Civil No. D-86-1705, in the District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
Testimony of John H. Klas; "Q. When did you first, 
to the best of your knowledge, have an occasion to 
talk to Carol about your intention to sell the home 
or what you expected to get out of it? A. It was 
either June or July of 1987." (Transcript, Vol. I, 
at p.18, 1.5-9). 
"Q. Well, this is what I'm — did there come a 
point in time when you had a conversation with her 
and told her it was your desire that the home be 
exposed to the market and sold? A. There is no 
question about that. That was understood right 
from the beginning. Q. But did you tell her that? 
A. Yes I did. Q. Would this have been around 
June/July time frame of 1987? A. Yes, I would say 
June of 1987." (Transcript, Vol. I, at p. 19, 1.18-
25, p.20, 1.1-3.) 
Testimony of Carol Klas: "Q. In approximately 
when did the election or the determination come 
about when he decided the home would be put on the 
market? A. I believe it would have been following 
the decree of divorce, because I had to make plans 
at that time whether to move out, find a job, and 
so we talked about this issue of remaining in the 
home and being there. Because he had already moved 
out and there would be someone there to show the 
home. So, it would have been I would say June, 
after the middle of June.11 (Transcript, Vol. II, 
at p.82, 1.25, p.83, 1.1-9). 
4. Pursuant to the provisions of the aforesaid Decree 
of Divorce, the former wife of the plaintiff, Carol Klas, 
undertook the marketing of the property and said property was 
not listed with a real estate broker. The plaintiff John H. 
Klas did not set a specific asking price for the property. 
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Testimony of John Klas; [Here John Klas reads a 
portion of his divorce decree] "A. If the 
defendant, prior to September 1, 1987, finds a 
buyer who is willing and able and ready to purchase 
the Berkley Street property at a price and upon 
terms acceptable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff 
shall pay to the defendant as a one - time finders 
fee for her services in showing the house and 
finding a buyer a sum equivalent to 3% of the gross 
sale price of the residence." (Transcript, Vol. I, 
at p.8, 1.2-11). 
"Q. After this conversation occurred, do you know 
what then transpired or happened from the 
standpoint of marketing the property? A. Well, I 
was aware of the fact because I drove past the home 
on occasion, that there was a sign in front of the 
yard that the home was for sale. I was aware of 
the fact that she contemplated having open houses 
in the home because she had told me that she 
intended to do that. I was aware of the fact that 
she intended to advertise the home because I saw 
the ads in the Salt Lake Tribune and the Deseret 
News advertising the home." (Transcript, Vol. I, 
at p.20, 1.17-25, p.21, 1.1-3). 
Testimony of Carol Klas: "Q. And during that 
period of time, did you undertake to find a buyer 
for the home that you were residing in on Berkley 
Street, which is the subject of this litigation? 
A. That is correct." (Transcript, Vol. II, at 
p.81, 1.6-10). 
"A. He gave me some guidelines to follow. We drew 
up an ad. I primarily wrote the ad. He reviewed 
it and said it would be acceptable to him. And it 
was placed in the Salt Lake in something called the 
newspaper agency which incorporates the Deseret and 
Salt Lake Tribune." (Transcript, Vol. II, at p.83, 
1.16-21). 
HQ. Did you do anything other than put the ad in 
the paper? Did you conduct an open house or make 
any effort that way? A. I believe, if I recall my 
memory, the Sunday indicated open house. I don't 
remember having an open house on Saturdays, but I 
did it primarily on the weekend. Yes, and I felt 
the response was very good, particularly by owner. 
. . . Q. When is the first open house that you 
can recall that was conducted in connection with 
the ad that was placed in the paper? A. About the 
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18th of July." (Transcript, Vol. II, at p.84, 
1.25, p.85, 1.1-7, 1.13-16). 
5. In 1986, plaintiff acquired an appraisal by Devere 
Kent (the Kent appraisal) for mortgage loan purposes. That 
appraisal showed a market value of $165,000. In anticipation 
of the sale of said property in 1987, plaintiff had personal 
acquaintances, engaged in real estate practice, provide 
opinion appraisals on the current value of the property which 
were oral in nature, and used by plaintiff as a basis for 
establishing the market value for sale of the property. Said 
opinion appraisals ranged from $175,000 to $192,000. 
Testimony of John Klas; "A. Mr. Kent is an 
appraiser who lives in Kerns, Utah. And what his 
qualifications are I am not familiar with. He 
apparently does work for Chase Manhattan Bank. 
Carol and I were in the process of applying for a 
second mortgage loan on the home prior to our 
divorce and Chase Manhattan Bank had asked him to 
make an appraisal for the home on it. Because 
banks are extremely conservative in their lending 
policies and they want to make sure that the value 
is reflected to secure the loan that they are 
making. And he was placed to make the appraisal at 
the suggestion of Chase Manhattan Bank. Q. Now, 
that was in connection with this financing that you 
and your then wife, Carol, contemplated? A. 
That's true." (Transcript, Vol. I, at p.32, 1.18-
25, p.33, 1.1-10). 
Testimony of Carol Klas: "Q. In the Chase 
Manhattan item we referred to, was that an effort 
to maintain separate financing on the home through 
Chase Manhattan? A. That would have been in 86. 
Q. That was the efforts; you were going to obtain 
some separate mortgage? A. Yes, to pay off some 
loans. Q. And an appraisal was performed in 
connection with that effort? A. Yes. I was not 
aware of it at the time because the property was in 
my name and John just asked me to come in and sign. 
So, I was not aware of the appraisal until some 
time later. Q. Sometime later after what? A. 
Uhm, perhaps when John and I were discussing what 
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he would enter as a consideration." (Transcript, 
Vol. II, at p.130, 1.8-23). 
Testimony of Kathryn Van Wagoner; "A. And the 
next question I asked was: 'How much is the house?1 
and she, right then said, 'We don't have a firm 
asking price.' And I said, 'Do you have any 
appraisals?' was my next question. And she said, 
'Yes. They range from $175 to somewhere in the low 
$190's.' And during that conversation, she told me 
about where the three came from. She did not tell 
me which one was which. She just mentioned 'One is 
from American Savings; that's where John is 
employed. Vick Ayers has given us another one. He 
is a good friend of Johns. ' He is with Gump & 
Ayers so I knew his name. I knew he was well known 
in real estate. And then the third name she 
mentioned was Mr. Howard Badger, who was a neighbor 
on Berkley Street who had been a principle of 
Badger/Jensen Reality for years. So, I knew those 
three names from that conversation that Saturday 
night. Q. Did you specifically ask for 
appraisals? A. Yes. Q. You have no doubt in 
your mind about that? A. No." (Transcript, Vol. 
II, at p.148, 1.15-25, p.149, 1.1-12). 
6. In late July or early August, 1987, the defendants 
inspected the property in the presence of Carol Klas and 
expressed an interest in acquiring the property. 
Testimony of Mark O. Van Wagoner; "Q. And did she 
reveal anything else to you as a result of that 
initial conversation? A. Well, she said that 
Carol would be in the house the next day and that 
we could go over and look at the house and talk to 
her some more about it. Q. Did you go over and 
look at the house? A. We did. Q. And how long 
did you spend looking at the home and inspecting 
it? A. Well, overall we spent a lot of time. On 
the next day, I think we spent a good deal of 
time." (Transcript, Vol. I, at p.93, 1.19-25, 
p.94, 1.1-4). 
Testimony of Kathryn Van Wagoner: "A. Well before 
the conversation ended, I asked her if we could 
come and see the house. Q. And did you schedule 
an appointment? A. Yes for the next day. Q. Did 
you go to the house on the next day? A. Yes. Q. 
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What did you do? A. We went through it. And we 
liked it. I had never been inside. That was the 
first time I had been inside. From the outside, we 
had always admired the house. It was attractive 
and it was always well maintained. And I think we, 
what we were looking for initially, it was just to 
see if it would work. Q. On the visit — when did 
this visit to the house occur, as best you recall? 
A. It was a Sunday and it was in the afternoon. I 
believe that the time that Carol said was probably 
right. I have no recollection of the exact time. 
It was not dark, though. It was not dusky; it was 
afternoon. It was a nice, summer afternoon. Q. 
Was this on the weekend of the 24th holiday? A. 
Yes, it was, the Sunday after tne July 24th 
holiday." (Transcript, Vol. II, at p.149, 1.16-25, 
p.150, 1.1-15). 
Testimony of Carol Klas: "Q. Alright, and tell 
the court, if you will, the first date that you can 
recall that the Van Wagoners contacted you with 
reference to the subject property? A. The 25th, I 
believe. It would have been a Saturday. Q. Of 
July? A. Of July. Q. Of 1987? A. That is 
correct. Q. And how did you recall that 
particular date? Is there some way that you can 
tie it to that? A. Because it was the day before 
my open house on the 26th. And they specifically 
asked if they could come over prior to the time. I 
think it was listed at 1:30 or 2:00 and they asked 
if they could come over before. And I agreed." 
(Transcript, Vol. II, at p.86, 1.7-23). 
7. In the course of defendants1 contact with Carol 
Klas, prior to August 11, 1987, references were made to the 
effect that she understood "appraisals" had bean made in the 
range of $175,000 to $192,000, which defendants believed to be 
of a written nature, however, there is a dispute whether 
plaintiff or Carol Klas represented that "written" appraisals 
existed. 
Testimony of Mark 0. Van Wagoner: "A. Well, I 
asked Kathryn if they had no price, how could we 
know whether we could be interested in the house? 
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And she told me that in the conversation with Carol 
Klas that she had suggested that their was a range 
of market values set by three appraisals of the 
property and that some offer in that range of 
market value would be acceptable. Q. Did she tell 
you what the range was? A. Yes. The range was 
from — my recollection is the range was from $170 
to the mid $190,s.lf (Transcript, Vol. I, at p.93, 
1.9-18). 
"We then asked her what the asking price was for 
the house. And she told us that she didn't have a 
definite asking price; that it had just gone on the 
market; that she was marketing the house pursuant 
to the decree of divorce; and that she had three 
appraisals on the property that ranged in value 
from $170,000 to $190,000 — one or three or 
something, but it was above $190, but just a little 
above $190. She told me and Kathryn, she explained 
that Mr. Klas had told her that he would not take 
anything outside of that range and that he was 
looking for a very substantial offer. We talked 
again about the appraisals. And I'll tell you, I 
do not recall whether it was at that time that she 
said that Mr. Klas had them and that she didn't. 
But we discussed the values and were they current 
and that sort of thing. She said, yes, that they 
were all available and that's why that she felt 
good about this range of price." (Transcript, Vol. 
I, at p.181, 1.19-25, p.182, 1.1-12). 
Testimony of Kathryn Van Wagoner: "A. And I said, 
'Do you have any appraisals?' Was my next 
question. And she said, 'Yes, they range from $175 
to somewhere in the low $190's." (Transcript, Vol. 
II, at p.148, 1.19-21). 
Testimony of Carol Klas: "A. Then I believe Mr. 
Van Wagoner said to me, 'How did Mr. Klas arrive at 
the price of $180,000? How did he arrive at that?' 
And I mentioned to him at the time, since I was 
involved in a decorative, more of a facilitator 
way, I did not know a great deal about the 
background of how he arrived at this, but I could 
share with him what John had told me. Q. Just 
tell us what you told the Van Wagoners in response 
to their inquiry? A. To their inquiry about how 
we arrived at this. Q. Yes. A. And I mentioned 
that Mr. Payne of American Savings and Loan had 
seen the home a year before and had drawn up some 
type of letter and had given this to Mr. Klas. And 
the provisions of that letter were one page. I had 
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indicated a year before we had applied for a loan, 
and I was aware there was something to qualify for 
a loan; that you had to have some kind of 
appraisal. So, I was aware there was something 
there but I was very vague on it. I thought that 
would be from Chase Manhattan Bank. Howard Badger 
had given an opinion to John, which John had shared 
with me. Vick Ayers had given an opinion to John. 
He had been through the home. And I believe there 
was one other opinion that had been raised, plus 
the fact that — I just can't recall. I think 
there was one other opinion - Vick Ayers and Howard 
Badger. I believe those were the main ones. And 
they had all come up. And I believe I said at that 
time, 'Mr. Klas is looking at a range from about 
$170 up to $190 or a little over $190." 
(Transcript, Vol. II, at p.90, 1.4-25, p.91, 1.1-
16) . 
9. Carol Klas presented the offer to her former 
husband, John H. Klas, who accepted the same on August 11, 
1987, and a closing date of September 15, 1987 was agreed upon 
by the parties and the premises were vacated in anticipation 
of the closing. The sales price for the premises was 
$175,000, which was the lowest price of the opinion appraisals 
provided by Carol Klas. 
Testimony of John Klas: "A. Yes. And in early 
August, approximately August 7th of 1987, Carol 
brought an earnest money agreement signed by Mark 
Van Wagoner & Kathryn Van Wagoner to me at my 
office." (Transcript, Vol. I. at p.21, 1.14-17). 
Testimony of Carol Klas: "Q. And did you then, in 
fact, take the document to his office downtown? A. 
I did at American Savings. Q. And did you deliver 
it to him? A. I did." (Transcript, Vol. II, at 
p.98, 1.20-24). 
19. Defendants were unaware of the "Kent" appraisal and 
were under the belief that the lowest appraisal referred to by 
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Carol Klas was the lowest appraisal on the property. The 
"Kent" appraisal, if known to the defendants, would have made 
a material difference in their offer to buy the subject 
property. 
Testimony of Mark 0. Van Wagoner: "A. I said, 
'The appraisal had come back at $137,000 I need 
your appraisals.' Q. What did Mr. Klas respond? 
A. He said, 'I'll get them.' Q. What happened 
then? A. About thirty minutes later, Mr. Klas 
came into my office. Q. And what happened? A. 
He had in his hand an appraisal by Devere Kent made 
in 1986. He handed it to me and said, 'Here; this 
ought to help. ' Q. When was the first time you 
saw the Kent appraisal? A. That very moment." 
(Transcript, Vol. II, at p.42, 1.1-14). 
Testimony of Kathrvn Van Wagoner: "Q. Mrs. Van 
Wagoner, you told Mr. Wall that you made no attempt 
to contact Mr. Klas prior to the 11th of August who 
obtained the appraisals, is that true? A. Yes. 
Q. Why didn't you? A. I thought they existed. I 
had no reason to doubt that there were no 
appraisals. I had no reason. I believe that there 
were. And I knew that we would get them. I knew 
John had been out of town because Carol had a hard 
time reaching him one weekend when she needed to. 
She said, 'He must have gone out of town. ' He 
didn't tell her, but she said, 'I can't find him; I 
can't find him.' I thought that when it came down 
to us, we will give him the $1,000. We will make 
this offer and we would get all the papers that we 
needed. We needed an appraisal; I knew that, to 
justify where we were going to be and to go to the 
bank and proceed with the transaction. I knew what 
we needed." (Transcript, Vol, II, at p.162, 1.3-
21) . 
20. However, defendants negotiated with plaintiff 
through Carol Klas pursuant to paragraph 4 above and pursuant 
to plaintiff and Carol Klas' understanding the range would be 
the property value of the three highest "appraisals." 
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Testimony of Mark 0. Van Wagoner: "Q. And did she 
reveal anything else to you as a result of that 
initial conversation? A. Well, she said that 
Carol would be in the house the next day and that 
we could go over and look at the house and talk to 
her some more about it." (Transcript, Vol.1 at 
p.93, 1.19-23). 
"Q. Is there any doubt in your mind but what at 
the time the document was signed by you and your 
wife that the sum of $175,000 was disclosed as the 
sales price? A. Yes, it was disclosed as the 
price that Carol told me John would accept if I 
offered it to him." (Transcript, Vol. I, at p.98, 
1.10-15). 
"A. Carol Klas told me — and I don't know that 
this is true — that John was a very difficult 
person; that he would not look kindly on an 
exception. That if we wanted to get the house — 
and she knew I wanted it — that I would have to 
let her show me and lead me through how to get it; 
and that there could be no condition, exceptions or 
other kinds of things written into the earnest 
money." (Transcript, Vol. I, at p.101, 1.18-25). 
"Q. So, when you were dealing with her, there was 
no doubt in your mind but what Mr. Klas was the 
owner of the property. A. No." (Transcript, Vol. 
I, at p.103, 1.23-25, p.104, 1.1). 
22. Although the defendants had opportunity to 
investigate the issue of fair market value of the property 
prior to execution of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement of 
August 7, 1987, they continued to rely upon the existence of 
appraisals as represented by Carol Klas regarding the market 
value of the property. 
Testimony of Kathryn Van Wagoner: "Q. Mrs. Van 
Wagoner, you told Mr. Wall that you made no attempt 
to contact Mr. Klas prior to the 11th of August to 
obtain the appraisals, is that true? A. Yes. Q. 
Why didn't you question Mark? A. I thought they 
existed. I had no reason to doubt that there were 
no appraisals. I had no reason. I believe that 
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there were. And I knew we would get them. I knew 
John had been out of town because Carol had a hard 
time reaching one weekend when she needed to. She 
said, he must have gone out of town. He didn't 
tell her, but she said, 'I can't find him; I can't 
find him. ' I thought when it came down to us, we 
will give him the $1,000. We will make this offer 
and we would get all the papers that we needed. We 
needed an appraisal; I knew that to justify where 
we were going to be and go to the bank and proceed 
with the transaction. I knew what we needed." 
(Transcript, Vol. II, at p.162, 1.3-21). 
28. The defendants, however, were negotiating on the 
understanding there were appraisals and the appraisals were in 
writing. 
Testimony of Mark O. Van Wagoner; "Q. I take it 
from what I have heard in your counsels opening 
statement and other comments, that it is your claim 
or contention that there was some representation 
about the existence of appraisals as being a 
relevant factor in this case, correct? A. That's 
correct." (Transcript, Vol. I, at p.101, 1.3-8). 
"A. Well, we had some truncated conversations in 
which I told Mr. Klas that I had to have the 
appraisals that I had been told existed." 
(Transcript, Vol. II, at p.43, 1.8-10). 
30. In the course of negotiations between the defendants 
and Carol Klas, there existed the Devere Kent appraisal 
valuing the property at $165,000, the existence of which was 
unknown to defendants, and if known, would have made a 
material difference in their offer to buy the subject 
property. This was a unilateral mistake on the part of the 
defendants which was fundamental and substantial. The Devere 
Kent appraisal was never provided by Carol Klas in spite of 
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defendants' request for copies of appraisals. In this regard, 
the Court does not find any fraud or misrepresentation on the 
part of the plaintiff. 
Testimony of Mark 0. Van Wagoner: "Q. Mr. Van 
Wagoner, if you will recall before the lunch hour, 
we were discussing a telephone conversation between 
you and Mr. Cowley on September 23, 1987; do you 
recall that? A. Yes. Q. After that telephone 
call on September 23rd, what was the next thing 
that happened with regard to the Berkley property? 
A. Well, I told Kathryn about the $161 offer. And 
we talked about whether it would be possible to do 
that in view of the fact that there was an 
appraisal for $137." (Transcript, Vol. II, at 
p.70, 1.21-25, p.71, 1.1-7). 
"A. Well, I decided that based on what Mr. Dimmick 
had told me that it would not be possible to use 
the $161 figure as a basis, and that I would need 
to use the $137 as a basis." (Transcript, Vol. II, 
at p.72, 1.4-7). 
Testimony of Kathryn Van Wagoner; "Q. Did you 
specifically ask for appraisals? A. Yes. Q. You 
have no doubt in your mind about that? A. No." 
(Transcript, Vol. II, at p.149, 1.9-12). 
31. The defendants considered the price of $175,000 as 
being a reasonable price for the property in question at the 
time the offer to purchase was submitted and executed by them, 
based on representations made by Carol Klas and without the 
benefit of the Devere Kent appraisal. 
Testimony of Mark 0. Van Wagoner; "Q. Is there 
any doubt in your mind but what at the time the 
document was signed by you and your wife that the 
sum of $175,000 was disclosed as the sales price? 
A. Yes, it was disclosed as a price that Carol 
told me John would accept if I offered it to him." 
(Transcript, Vol. I, at p.98, 1.10-15). 
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32. The defendants made no attempt to secure appraisals 
on the subject property prior to the time the Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement was entered into by the parties, because of 
representations made by Carol Klas, there were "appraisals" in 
existence. 
Testimony of Mark 0. Van Wagoner: "Q. Is there 
any doubt in your mind but what at the time the 
document was signed by you and your wife that the 
sum of $175,000 was disclosed as the sales price? 
A. Yes, it was disclosed as a price that Carol 
told me John would accept if I offered it to him." 
(Transcript, Vol. I, at p.98, 1.10-15). 
Testimony of Kathryn Van Wagoner; "Q. Mrs. Van 
Wagoner, you told Mr. Wall that you made no attempt 
to contact Mr. Klas prior to the 11th of August to 
obtain the appraisals, is that true? A. Yes. Q. 
Why didn't you? A. I thought they existed. I had 
no reason to doubt that there were no appraisals. 
I had no reason. I believe that there were." 
(Transcript, Vol. II, at p.162, 1.3-10). 
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